vaguely connected thoughts on utility & moral actions

The gestural language developed in the representational tradition, codified and represented states of mind and body in terms of determined sets of movements and facial expressions. What was considered 'representational' has become for us generally the very definition of the 'theatrical'. Now movements of the body and face are the object of psychology and sets of normative standards that recognise the symptomatic and define the healthy from the sick. The range of movements and capacities of the body are the object for training and disciplining for specialised roles in a technological society. Competence and dexterity of manual control and movement are virtues, in a society that values utility above all, competence becomes a supreme virtue.

When we evaluate the performance of the military, our thinking is almost always framed by this consideration, 'they are expertly trained, they make mistakes, but because of their training and discipline we can safely assume they didn't really mean to, and we criticise them accordingly - as not really capable of doing bad things, because they are only doing their job, for which they are extremely well trained'. It seems evaluating as competent/incompetent the performance of an action, we can postpone perhaps indefinitely, more troubling issues.
It's interesting also the inference we make about violence inflicted by untrained people - they are motivated by a deep hatred - it is totally pathological. Violence committed by untrained people on 'our side' is often heroic, a spontaneous outburst of bravery. Violence by 'the other side' who are clearly trained, however is the sign of a devious, cunning and duplicitous nature.

Of course disciplining and training is very necessary and of clear benefit; the skill of the surgeon, the musician, the expert skills that are of general benefit to society, and in those countries which still permit the death penalty some people would add the competence and skill of the executioner, .
This Sunday I read an article in the New York Times magazine about the current controversy of administering lethal injections. The slowing conveyor-belt of executions has come to a full-stop in some states in the US because there are concerns that this means of execution inflicts undue suffering and pain on the individual. In the article Robert Blecker a Law professor at Columbia is interviewed, as a supporter of the death penalty, he believes we should be indifferent to the fact of whether pain will be inflicted on the prisoner. The article comments on Foucault and Discipline and Punish where '[Foucault] observed that in the West, the locus of punishment has shifted away from the body to the soul, and because execution requires an act of violence, it is a task we are almost ashamed to perform. [Blecker continues] "Foucault was not a fan of the death penalty, but he was right, the twitching, the moaning, we can't even tolerate that." Executions, to be ethical, must be transparent, Blecker maintains: "My view is that executions should be public, that we should take responsibility for what we do. If we can't face it, we should abolish it."
We shouldn't go out of our way to inflict pain, but if pain results from the process of destroying the individual, who for sake of argument we'll assume is guilty, then we shouldn't go out of our way to prevent the suffering. I suppose Blecker is suggesting, if we believe this is the right thing to do, we should develop a steely indifference to the prisoners manifest suffering, perhaps we can train the administrators of the chemical cocktail so they are better at their jobs, but we'll have to accept the fact that at least some executions will be botched.
Hume says that we all experience a certain amount of indifference towards vice and suffering, the out of sight, out of mind principle, but now we practice a 'studied indifference', this is how we 'manage the flow', and to an extent accept the fact of suffering for the 'greater good'.
It is almost as if the utility principle has got disconnected from a body that Hume thought was always going to be capable of making certain choices, on the basis of enduring psychology. It's difficult to make out whether he believes social goods are selected in relation and correspondence to our sentimental make-up, or whether our sentiments are selected according to the social good they do.
The place of utility here is interesting, because in the first case it rests upon a understanding of human sentiment that Hume suggests cannot be totalised, the second on the fact that it can in a snap-shot sort of way relative to what at any particular moment helps society prosper.